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Does Director Trading Change the Information Environment?

Abstract
Investigating ASX300 firms for the period 2002-2010, we find that the information content of
director trading has a negative relationship with post-trade information asymmetry, but a
positive relationship with information efficiency. These results are mainly driven by director
purchases rather than their sales, and are stronger in non-executive director trading. Our
results are robust to the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008.
These findings back the claims of insider trading proponents, by showing that director trading
plays a crucial role in reducing information asymmetry and in improving information
efficiency for stock market participants.
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1.

Introduction
We investigate the effect of trading by directors in their own firm’s shares (known as

corporate insider trading) on two aspects of the firm’s information environment: information
asymmetry and stock price informational efficiency. While these legal trades can be
conducted for liquidity and diversification reasons, some trades are based on insiders’
informational advantage (Seyhun, 1992; Brown, Foo and Watson, 2003). The relationship
between insider trading and market efficiency is an important consideration in the enactment
and enforcement of regulation on insider trading globally. The abnormal returns following
these trades raise residual concerns that the existing regulation that allows insiders to trade in
their own firm’s shares under certain conditions but requires them to disclose their trading in
a timely manner may not be entirely effective.1
The pioneering work of economists such as Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) is based on the notion that trading by informed traders or insiders is the primary
channel by which information is incorporated into price. Advocates for insider trading argue
that these insiders possess superior information compared to outsiders. Insider trading
therefore enhances the information environment by improving stock price informativeness
which in turn results in better resource allocation and improved decision making. For
example, Manne (1966), Carlton and Fischel (1983), and Leland (1992) argue that insider
trading speeds up the flow of insiders’ private information into stock prices, thereby
enhancing the information environment by improving stock price informativeness.
Empirically, Seyhun (1988), Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) and Piotroski and Roulstone
(2005) show that trading by insiders incorporates new, private and firm specific information
into price. However, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) among others, challenge this view,
1

S1002G(1) of the Corporations Act provides the definition of insider and inside information is defined in
s1042A. S1043A prohibits insiders acquiring, or disposing of, financial products based on inside information.
s205G (4) requires directors to disclose trades in their company’s securities within 14 days of the transaction.
The ASX Listing Rules 3.19A.1 and 3.19A.2 stipulate that changes of directors’ interests must be disclosed
within five working days.
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contending that insider trading impairs price informativeness and deteriorates stock price
efficiency. This is because other traders, aware of the presence of insiders in the market, are
discouraged from collecting and trading on information or they may exit the market
altogether. Specifically, Bushman, Piotroki and Smith (2005) find that insider trading crowds
out private information acquisition by outsiders. Investigating analyst following in countries
that impose restrictions on insider trading activities, they however find that the crowding-out
effect is concentrated in emerging markets. Similarly, Ausubel (1990) shows that regulation
enhances market confidence and wider participation by investors who can now trade on a
level playing field. However, Durnev and Nain (2007) report that while stricter regulation
deters private information trading, it is less effective in firms with high agency costs. These
contradicting points of view highlight the tension between boosting market efficiency (where
private information is reflected in stock price) and maintaining market confidence and
integrity (to reduce exploitation of investors by better informed parties).
We direct our focus to the interplay between insider trading and the firm’s
information environment, which includes two important dimensions namely, information
asymmetry and stock price informativeness. Information asymmetry occurs when there are
informational differences across investors in a market. According to microstructure theory, it
exists when informed traders are present in the market. To protect themselves from potential
losses when trading with more informed traders, liquidity traders demand wider bid-ask
spreads (Kyle, 1985, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Corporate insiders represent one such
group of potentially informed traders with access to private information. Regulation however
prohibits them from trading on price sensitive information although, when they do trade, they
are required to disclose their trades to the market in a timely manner. According to Huddart,
Hughes and Levine (2001), public disclosure of insider trades hastens price discovery while
reducing trading profits. Another dimension of the information environment is information
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efficiency. Information efficiency differs from information asymmetry because it depends on
the precision of private information held by corporate insiders. Price informativeness can be
useful for corporate decisions. For example, Ferreira et al. (2011) report substitution of board
monitoring with price informativeness, because more informative prices make boards more
effective and reduce the need for board independence.
In this study, we apply two measures from contemporary microstructure literature, the
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread (adverse selection cost) and the probability
of information-based trading (PIN). Similar approaches were taken by Straser (2002), Aslan
(2002) and Sidhu, Smith, Whaley and Willis (2008) in their examination of the effects of
Regulation FD on information asymmetry. These measures have also been selected because
their relationship with insider trading has not been previously examined within the Australian
market where such an examination is necessary. Essentially, they reflect the benefits (more
efficient prices) and costs (cost of adverse selection) on the information environment.
We use the PIN measure developed by Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996)
which provides a direct measure of informed trading by analysing information in the trade
flow. Many empirical studies examine the role of price informativeness on corporate
decisions, using PIN as the proxy for informativeness. For example, Ferreira et al. (2011) find
that more informative prices make boards more effective and reduce the need for board
independence. Kang and Liu (2010) show that risk-driven information-based trading leads to
improved CEO incentives. Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) report that price
informativeness affects firm investment policy. The adverse selection cost measure, on the
other hand, reflects the cost of trading with informed investors. Where market makers are
present, adverse selection cost is designed to capture the cost of compensating the market
makers when they trade with informed investors (Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009).
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We find that director trades reduce information asymmetry (adverse selection cost)
and increase information efficiency (price informativeness). Further analysis reveals that the
results can be predominantly attributed to director purchases instead of their sales. In addition,
we find that non-executive (independent) director trading, rather than trading by executives,
improves the information efficiency of the stock trading environment. Finally, we examine
the marginal impact of two significant market events, the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the
global financial crisis in 2008, on the association between the information content of director
trading and the stock trading environment. We find no impact arising from these two events,
suggesting that our findings are robust under different market conditions. Therefore, we
present a contemporary investigation of the effect of insider trading on two microstructure
measures, reflecting information asymmetry and efficiency in the firm’s information
environment. Further decomposition of the insider trades suggests that insider purchases are
more likely to be driven by information than insider sales, since the latter can be motivated
by liquidity and portfolio diversification. In addition, non-executives’ trades contain more
information than executive trades, possibly because the latter are under stricter monitoring
and scrutiny. We triangulate the insider trades and measures of information asymmetry with
abnormal returns following these trades. This is because the returns to trades signal the
private information associated with them, where higher returns are indicative of more
informed trades. To the best of our knowledge, our findings have not been documented in the
Australian market and our study contributes to the existing literature due to interesting
differences between the Australian and U.S. markets.
We contend that the Australian market is an ideal setting to examine the relation
between director trading and the stock market information environment for the following
reasons. First, the information environment in Australia is managed by the Continuous
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Disclosure Regime2, which was introduced in 1994. It aims to reduce information asymmetry
between management and investors and also between different types of investors. This is
achieved through effective and timely disclosure where firms are expected to inform
investors (via the Australian Securities Exchange, ASX) of any market sensitive information
when it becomes aware of such information. Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999) report
increases in disclosures with the introduction of the Continuous Disclosure Regime, although
such changes were limited to small and poorly performing firms. In contrast, when they
examined increased enforcement under the same regime, Hsu, Lindsay and Tuttici (2012)
find deterioration in analyst forecast dispersion in small firms, likely due to the ban on
selective disclosure to financial analysts. Such continuous and periodic reporting frequency
affects the firm’s information environment where for example, compared to US firms, the
majority of Australian firms report earnings on a half-yearly basis.
Second, although insider trading regulation is now commonplace in both developed
and emerging markets with Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) reporting insider trading laws in
87 out of the 103 countries in their study, Australia continues to stand out among common
law countries with restrictive insider trading regulation (Beny, 2005). There have also been
improvements in enforcement with increases in prosecutions for insider trading in recent time.
Such strong regulation and effective enforcement are predicted to alter both the information
environment and the trading behaviour of insiders as shown in Brochet (2010) after the
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S. and Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2008) after the
Securities Market Amendment Act (SMAA) in New Zealand.
Last, a persistent finding exists in Australian director trading studies where director
sales are reported to have more information content about future firm performance compared
to purchases (see for example, Brown, Foo and Watson, 2003). This is in contrast to the more

2

The Continuous Disclosure Regime is regulated in Chapter 6CA (s674-678) of the Corporations Act and
through the ASX Listing Rules (Chapter 3).
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prevalent finding that purchases have comparatively more information content (Lakonishok
and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog, 2006). In Hong Kong however, abnormal
returns are earned on both insider purchases and sales (Cheuk, Fan and So, 2006) Fidrmuc,
Korczak and Korczak (2013) also find that in countries with stronger governance and
enforcement mechanisms, insider purchases are more informative. While there is general
agreement that insider purchases signal the firm’s favourable future prospects, the
information associated with sales is less clear. Insider sales can signal negative information
about the firm’s prospects, but they can also be conducted for liquidity, rebalancing or
diversification, which are less informative. With the contrasting information content between
purchases and sales, it is interesting to investigate whether the insider purchases or sales in
Australia have stronger effect on the information environment.
The time period covered in our study traversed two significant market-wide events,
the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008, which had the potential
to change the firm’s information environment. Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) and Barth,
Landsman and Lang (2008) suggest that reporting under IFRS increases transparency
resulting in higher quality financial reporting. There is also a counter-contention that IFRS
would bring little change to accounting quality as Australian domestic standards were similar
to IFRS and being a common law country, it has strong investor protection (Jeanjean and
Stolowy, 2008). However, Brochet et al (2013) report that following IFRS adoption by UK
firms, there was a reduction in private information benefits in the form of lower abnormal
returns with insider purchases only. Another important event that could potentially influence
the relationship between director trading profitability and stock information environment was
the global financial crisis in 2008. Panic among investors during the crisis impaired market
liquidity and increased the adverse selection effect of director trading (Brunnermeier &
Pedersen, 2009). Directortrading can be more informative when the trading of other investors
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becomes rare in the post-crisis period due to the lack of confidence. We therefore take a step
further to look at whether these significant market events had any influence on the
relationship between director trading and the stock information environment. Consistent with
previous studies, we find that the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in
2008 had significant impacts on the information environment, but neither event had a
significant moderating effect on the association between the director trading and the stock
information environment. Thus, our findings are robust under different market conditions.
This study contributes the literature in several ways. First, our results highlight the
effects of director trading on the information environment. In particular, trading by directors
reduces information asymmetry and improves information efficiency for stock market
participants. Second, we mark the importance of the types of director trades (purchase or sale)
and the roles played by the directors (executives or non-executives) in assessing the effect on
the information environment. We thereby provide additional information for regulators and
monitors of the capital market, which helps improve the efficiency of insider trading
regulation and disclosure requirements, leading to better investor protection. Finally, global
events such as the introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the
global financial crisis (GFC) did not impact on the relation between insider trade returns and
the firm’s trading environment, suggesting it is robust to different time periods and market
conditions. Our study urges a more comprehensive documentation of director trading activity
so that we can better understand the impact and effect of these activities on many aspects of
firm value and trading participation.
The remainder of the study is as follows. Section 2 presents the review of the
literature and hypothesis. Section 3 provides data, method and descriptive statistics. Section 4
and Section 5 give the results and conclusions, respectively.
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2.

Prior work and hypotheses

2.1 Prior work on the relation between insider trading and information environment
Information-driven trading by corporate insiders is a double-edged sword; it can
potentially both benefit and harm the firm’s information environment. Such informed trading
affects information asymmetry because corporate insiders have access to information
unavailable to outside investors. Insiders also have the opportunity to extract private benefits
by trading on this information. With these trades, insiders’ private information is incorporated
into the stock prices, and thereby insider trading can make stock price more informative.
Proponents of insider trading such as Manne (1966) and Carlton and Fischel (1983)
contend that insider trading is beneficial because it improves the firm’s information
environment. They suggest that insiders are the most informed parties about their firm’s
future prospects. As they trade, their private information is incorporated into stock prices in a
more timely and accurate fashion, and thus their transactions improve the firm’s information
efficiency. In contrast, others believe that insider trading exacerbates the information
asymmetry faced by outside market participants, thereby discouraging investment (Ausubel,
1990) and reducing market liquidity (Leland, 1992). Further, Fishman and Hagerty (1992)
argue that insider trading harms the information environment as it deters outside market
participants from collecting and trading on information because insider trading squeezes
gains available to outsiders.
It is generally expected that insiders are motivated by trading profits based on their
informational advantage regarding the firm’s prospects. Models of informed trading such as
Kyle (1985) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) assume that an insider is informed in every
period, making it ideal to trade in every period. However, realistically, corporate insiders may
not possess equal amounts of superior information all the time. In fact, they are presumed to
have more informational advantage during certain times such as prior to earnings
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announcements or takeover announcements (see Ke, Huddart and Petroni, 2003; Agrawal and
Nasser, 2012). Insider trades are also relatively infrequent, due to the trading restrictions
imposed on them by firm trading policies. Kyle’s (1985) theoretical model demonstrates that
informed trading worsens the information environment as it leads to wider spreads due to the
adverse selection problem between informed traders and other market participants. In Glosten
and Milgrom’s (1985) model, when traders with superior information are present, there is a
widening of the bid-ask spread. Similarly, Copeland and Galai (1983) show that the bid-ask
spread is positively related to price level and return variance and negatively with market
activity and depth.
Empirically, the effect of insider trading on the information environment has been
examined using various proxies for the information environment, with mixed results. Using
the bid-ask spread, Chung and Charoenwong (1998) find that in firms with a greater
proportion of insider trading, market makers protect themselves with wider spreads. Although
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) report that enforcement of insider trading laws improves stock
price informativeness, the effect is concentrated in developed markets. Piotroski and
Roulstone (2004) find an inverse relationship because these trades contain firm specific
information. Khan et al (2011) find no change in spread with insider sales for NASDAQ-100
stocks. However, there are liquidity increases with active informed trading (Cornell and Sirri,
1992) while there is an increase in effective spread during permitted insider trading periods
(Bettis et al. 2000). Cao et al. (2004) report small and transitory increases in the effective
spread with insider trading activities, although Cheng, Firth, Leung and Rui (2006) show
wider spreads and lower depths on insider trading days compared to other days.
Clarke and Shastri (2000) report no relationship between insider trades and PIN while
Aktas, de Bodt and van Oppens (2008) show changes in relative order imbalance as a result
of insider trading, indicative of faster price discovery on these days. Huddart and Ke (2007)
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use six information asymmetry proxies including institutional ownership, analysts following,
book-to-market ratio, frequency of firm reporting losses, firm reporting R&D expenditure
and abnormal returns over previous earnings announcements. Overall, they find that the first
four proxies do not reflect information asymmetry while R&D expenditure and abnormal
returns do so for models of informed trading.

2.2 Hypotheses development
Considering the contradictory findings of the effects of insider trades on the
information environment using various proxies, we re-examine the effect on insider trading
activity on two interconnected contemporary measures of the information environment:
adverse selection cost and the probability of informed trading (PIN) in the Australian market,
a developed market with restrictive insider trading laws and effective enforcement. We relate
the returns from insider trades, instead of the trades themselves to cost of adverse selection
and the probability of informed trading because the information content of the trades is
reflected in the post-trade returns. If insiders trade for private information, they should earn
superior returns, i.e. the stock’s abnormal return is positive (negative) after informed insider
purchase (sale).
The adverse selection cost is an indirect measure of the cost of information
asymmetry that together with order processing costs, inventory costs and competition make
up the bid-ask spread. We directly use the cost of adverse selection instead of the bid-ask
spread to eliminate the cross-sectional variation in the other components. Theoretically (see
Kyle, 1985; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), a positive relationship
is predicted between informed trading and information asymmetry. In the context of
regulatory changes, Frijns, Gilbert and Tourani-Rad (2008) report a decrease in information
asymmetry (spread) as a consequence of a change to the insider trading regulation in New
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Zealand. However, Budsaratragoon, Hillier and Lhaophadchan (2012) caution that when
insider trading regulations from developed economies are adopted in emerging ones such as
Thailand, these regulations are ineffective as insiders continue to earn excess returns by
exploiting their privileged information.
Directors as a group of informed traders, trade on their private information, and this
may increase information asymmetry between corporate managers and outside investors.
Therefore, the insider trading activity will increase the adverse selection cost and worsen the
information environment. In contrast, informed directors may deter informed trading by other
non-insiders and level the playing field between informed and uninformed traders (Fishman
and Hagerty, 1992). As a result, adverse selection cost can be reduced due to director trading.
These competing hypotheses are stated as:
H1:

Director trading activity increases information asymmetry.

H1a: Director trading activity decreases information asymmetry.

Another dimension of the information environment is information efficiency.
Information asymmetry and information efficiency are not identical concepts because the
latter depends on the precision of private information held by corporate directors. Information
efficiency increases the price informativeness and is useful for corporate decisions. For
example, Ferreira et al. (2011) find the informed stock price increase the board efficiency and
reduces the need for board independence. Kang and Liu (2010) find the risk-driven
information-based trading leads to improved CEO incentives.
One would only observe a significant impact of director trading on information
efficiency if directors are exposed to precise private information and such information is not
yet disclosed to other market participants. Therefore, the informed director trading can be
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conducive to the information efficiency of stock trading environment (Fishman and Hagerty,
1992). These two hypotheses are stated as:
H2:

Director trading activity increases information efficiency.

H2a: Director trading activity decreases information efficiency.

Next we investigate the insider motivation hypothesis. Insiders have different
incentives for buying and selling shares, so we examine the effects of director purchases and
director sales on the cost of adverse selection and PIN separately. The motivation for insider
purchases is typically private information while for sales, the motivation could also be noninformationally-based such as liquidity and diversification. In other words, insider purchases
are expected to provide a clearer signal of its informational content than insider sales. Some
research on insider motivations for trading supports these contentions. For example,
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) both find that sales are not informative about
future firm performance, and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) specifically report that only insider
purchases in small firms predict firm future returns. Similarly, Seyhun (1992) shows that
sales, especially in large firms, have lower information content. In addition, Fidrmuc,
Goergen and Renneboog (2006) argue that the market’s reaction to insider purchases and
sales is a function of ownership levels held by the insiders and other block holders due to the
effect of the latter’s monitoring on information asymmetry.
In Australia, however there is the persistent and puzzling finding that insider sales
have more information content than purchases (Brown et al, 2003, Chang, Hillman and
Watson, 2005). Therefore abreakdown into purchases and sales is crucial when examining the
Australian market. Hodgson and van Praag (2006) suggest a reason for this finding is the
proportional difference in insider trading for non-information reasons between U.S. and
Australian insiders as a result of their equity related compensation. In addition, insider trades
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in Australian studies are made up of trades by corporate directors only, while with the U.S.
definition of insider, the reported trades include trades by shareholders with holdings of five
percent or more. These shareholders in Australia (known as substantial shareholders) report
their trades under a different regulation.
In light of the reported disparity in information content between director purchases
and sales in Australian firms as in Brown et al (2003), we predict that the trading direction
matters in the relationship between director trading and information environment. Therefore
the hypotheses are stated as below:
H3: Director purchases have stronger effects on the information environment than
director sales.
H3a: Director sales have stronger effects on the information environment than
director purchases.

Recent studies recognise that insiders are not a homogenous group. They play various
roles within the firm and therefore have access to different types of firm specific information
(Knewtson and Nofsinger, 2014). In addition, depending on their roles, insiders are subject to
different levels of scrutiny and have different incentives to trade on private information.
While executive directors are responsible for the running and management of the firm, nonexecutive directors are expected to be independent of the firm and to monitor the activities
and decisions of executive directors. An examination of the returns to insider trades reflects
the interaction between the information on which trades are based (information hierarchy
hypothesis) and the scrutiny hypothesis (willingness to capitalise on the information, given
the scrutiny and visibility of the insider).
Top-level insiders have access to more value-relevant information, as indicated by
their trading activities (Lin and Howe, 1990; Nunn, Madden and Gombola, 1983; Seyhun,

15

1986). However, Fidrmuc et al (2006) did not find a relationship between insider position and
subsequent returns, possibly due to the more intense scrutiny on senior management.
Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) and Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer (2010) both consider the
incentives to take advantage of private information and the impediments created by legal and
reputational risks.3 In a study of late reported insider trades, Chang and Watson (2015) show
that purchases by all insiders in small firms signalled future positive returns while only sales
by executives in large firms predicted future negative returns. Ravina and Sapienza (2010)
compare the trading returns of independent directors and executive directors. They find only
small differences in their purchases, indicating that they maybe trading on similar
information. Similarly, Gray, Harymawan and Nowland (2014) report that political and
government connections on corporate boards have no particular effect on shareholder wealth
in Australian firms.

Therefore, there are inconsistent findings on the information possessed by different
types of directors in the firm together with the effect of such information on their trading
patterns. It is possible that executives have more material private information than nonexecutive directors, but executives are under stricter scrutiny than non-executive directors. If
non-executive directors trade relatively freely, the information content of non-executive
director trading can be richer than that of executive director trading. On the other hand, nonexecutive directors are responsible for monitoring the activities of the board and may be less
likely to trade opportunistically.
H4: Non-executive director trades have stronger effects on information environment
than executive director trades. .

3

Piotroski and Roulstone (2007) analyse the non-linear relationship between insider trading and next year's
earnings surprise. They report an increase in the likelihood of trading with the earnings surprise. However, this
relationship does not hold in the case of extreme news.
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H4a: Executive director trades have stronger effects on information environment than
non-executive director trades.

3.

Data and Variable Construction
In this section, we describe the data sources and variable construction employed to

test our predictions. Our sample period starts from the fiscal year ending on or after July 2002
through to June 2010. We winsorise variables at the top and bottom one percent of the
distribution, to eliminate the effect of outliers.

3.1 Measuring the information content of director trades
We compile our sample by collecting director trade information from Appendix 3Y
Change in Director Interest announcements on Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium. The
sample is limited to ASX300 firms on the basis of market capitalisation at the beginning of
each year. This includes the largest and more liquid firms with considerable trading by
directors. To ensure no bias in the chosen sample, we conducted a pilot study and collected
director trade information for the Top 500 firms by market capitalisation (based on the All
Ordinaries Index) in the 2010 fiscal year. The director trades in ASX300 firms account for
approximately 70% of the sample, assuring us that substantial director trading activity occurs
in these firms.
From Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium, director trade information including
director name, director position, trade and report dates, number of shares traded, transaction
price and the direction of trade (purchase or sale) are obtained. We exclude any trades due to
reasons such as participation in dividend reinvestment plans, bonus issues, rights issues,
employee share purchase schemes, option conversions, convertible note conversions and
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exercise of performance rights. This filtering results in an initial sample of 21,973 trades over
the nine-year period.
On the basis of the director trade information, we use the (implied) profitability of
director trades as the proxy for the information revealed through director trades. In other
words, we expect profitable director transactions if corporate directors utilise their private
informational advantage in their trades. Following prior literature (Ahmad et al. 2004;
Friederich et al., 2002), the director trade profitability (CAR) is computed as the cumulative
market-adjusted over the event window [0, 120], where day 0 represents the director
transaction date. For ease of interpretation, we multiply CAR by -1 for director sales. We use
the profit from these trades, instead of the trades themselves, because their information
content is reflected in the post-trade returns. If insiders trade based on private information,
they should earn superior profits, i.e. CAR is positive (negative) after informed insider
purchase (sale), and a higher CAR indicates the insider has more informational advantage.
In Table 1, we note that the mean value of CAR is 0.0242 and the median value is
0.0178. The unreported results show that the mean is significantly different from zero,
suggesting that director transactions are profitable on average, reassuring us that director
trade profitability is a good proxy for the information content of director trades.

<Please insert Table 1 here>

3.2 Measuring Firm Information Environment
Measures of a firm’s information environment in previous studies have been marketoriented or related to firm characteristics. We chose market-oriented measures because they
are less subject to managerial discretion and therefore are more exogenous than measures
based on firm characteristics. For example, managers may time or distort disclosures
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depending on their trading intentions (Rogers, 2008). Firm characteristics such as firm size
and book-to-market ratio are simultaneously affected by determinants other than information
asymmetry. Analyst coverage and institutional ownership estimate the external information
search, but the data maybe too static to observe the immediate impact of insider trading.
Market-oriented measures, on the other hand, directly gauge the informational impact
of insider trades and are less subject to alternative explanations. Recent studies deploy similar
proxies to examine the quality of a firm’s information environment. For example, Haggard,
Howe and Lynch (2015) use spreads and other illiquidity ratios as proxies for information
asymmetry and interpret a decrease in the illiquidity measures following non-recurring
changes in earnings as an improvement in informational transparency. Chen, Goldstein and
Jiang (2007) use PIN to assess the effect of price informativeness on firm investment policy.
Some studies use daily measures, such as Amihud’s (2002) ratio and C2 in Llorente et al.
(2002), but these measures are calculated from daily returns and the aggregated daily trading
volume and thus may overlook some information incorporated in high-frequency data. Given
our access to intraday data, we are able to calculate an adverse selection measure and PIN
that utilize all relevant transactions and quotations, which should accurately reflect the
information revealing process though trades. Nonetheless, the PIN developed by Easley et al
(1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) is based on assumptions that independent
information events occur daily and informed traders act on these events on the day they occur.
In reality, these assumptions may not hold. In addition, PIN may also be correlated with other
variables. For example, in a high information asymmetry stock, the adverse selection effect
could show up as low trading volume and wide spreads. If PIN is correlated with some other
factor, which in turn correlated with information asymmetry, then PIN will be correlated with
the probability of informed trading; although information asymmetry is not identical to
informed trading (Benos and Jochec, 2007). Mohanram and Rajgopal (2006) confirm that
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PIN is not a risk factor that is priced in a cross-section of returns. Duarte and Young (2009)
consider the issue of whether PIN is priced because it is associated with information
asymmetry or other liquidity factors. They show that the PIN component related to
information asymmetry is not priced, unlike its other component associated with liquidity,
which is. Taking another perspective, Bollen, Smith and Whalley (2004) develop a simple
and parsimonious bid-ask spread model that takes into account the minimum price tick, order
processing costs, inventory holding costs, adverse selection costs and competition. An
innovation of this model was that the probability of informed trading could be identified,
thereby bypassing some of the issues with information asymmetry in the previously
mentioned models.
Various proxies have been used to study the relationship between insider trades and
information environment and the results are understandably mixed. For example, Chung and
Charoenwong (1998) find no change in spread or depth on insider trading days. Cornell and
Sirri (1992) find liquidity increases with active informed trading, while Bettis et al. (2000)
find an increase in effective spread during permitted insider trading periods. Cao et al. (2004)
report small and temporary increases in the effective spread for insider trading activities,
although Cheng, Firth, Leung and Rui (2006) show wider spreads and lower depths on insider
trading days than on other days. Clarke and Shastri (200) report no relationship between
insider trades and PIN. Huddart and Ke (2007) use six information asymmetry proxies
(institutional ownership, analyst following, market to book ratio, loss frequency, R&D
expenditure and abnormal return over past earnings announcements) when they investigated
the relationship between insider trades and the firm’s information environment. They
concluded that either the first four are not good proxies for information asymmetry or else,
the models of informed trading cannot be applied to corporate insider trading. The variability
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in these results recommends both careful selection of the appropriate proxy for information
asymmetry and the sensitivity of the insider trades measure.
Drawing on prior literature and to demonstrate the trade-offs expected with director
trading, we measure two dimensions of the firm’s information environment using marketbased measures estimated from stock intraday transactions data. The advantage of using
market-based measures is that these measures directly reflect the outcome of information
asymmetry and information efficiency improvements resulting from director transactions.
The market-based measures reflect the cost and benefit for investors as a result of the director
trades. The proxy for firm information asymmetry is adverse selection cost while the proxy
for corporate information efficiency is the probability of informed trading (PIN) measure. We
estimate these two information proxies using stock intraday transactions data drawn from
Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database.
The classic market microstructure literature suggests that adverse selection cost and
inventory cost are two major determinants of stock transaction costs. In this analysis, the
computation of adverse selection cost for each trade follows the construct used in Goyenko, Holden,
and Trzcinka (2009). For each trade i, we compute the corresponding adverse selection cost
measure as follows:
5  Minute Adverse Selection Cost i  2  D i (ln(M i 5 )  ln(M i ))

(1)

where M i 5 denotes the midpoint of prevailing quote prices five minutes after trade i and M i is
the midpoint of prevailing quote prices for trade i; Di denotes the trade direction which takes the
value of one if trade i is a buy transaction and takes the value of negative one if it is a sell
transaction. Given that the TRTH database does not provide trade directions, we use Lee and Ready
(1991) algorithm to assign trade directions. The daily adverse selection cost measure is equal to the
value-weighted average of intraday adverse selection costs across all trades.
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The measure of information asymmetry used in subsequent empirical analysis is
computed as the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where
day 0 is the date of director transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs
computed over the window [-120, -21] (denoted as adjAdverse). As shown in Table 1, the
unscaled daily average adverse selection cost (Adverse) ranges from 0.0003 to 0.0106, with a
mean value of 0.0024 and median of 0.0018. These statistics obtained from Australian stocks
are largely comparable to those shown in the U.S studies. To reflect the rise in information
asymmetry in the event window, we apply scaling to the Adverse variable.
On the assumption that firm information efficiency is reflected by how quickly
superior information is impounded into stock prices, we use the PIN measure developed by
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) as the proxy for information efficiency. This
measure is based on a structural market microstructure model which consists of three
participants, noise traders, informed traders and a market maker. Informed traders will trade
on their private information when they believe the information is not publicly known. Thus,
PIN directly captures the private information incorporated into stock price and measures the
informativeness (Ferreira et al., 2011; Kang and Liu, 2010; Chen et al., 2007). The PIN
measure in the event window [0, 120] relative to director transaction date is estimated in two
steps: we first identify the trades on each trading day as a buy or sell transaction; in the next
step, we use the algorithm in Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) to estimate PIN
over 120 days from the day of the transaction. Again, the raw PIN measure is scaled by its
estimate obtained from the [-120, -21] window in order to control for the level of information
efficiency.
Table 1 summarises the distribution of variables. In our sample, adjAdverse ranges
from 0.4223 to 2.3959, with a mean of 1.0237. The mean and median values of PIN are
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0.1818 and 0.1715, respectively, similar to the PIN statistics documented for the NYSE
stocks.

3.3 Other variables
We also control for a number of firm-level variables in our study. These control
variables are turnover (Turnover), return volatility (Volatility), book-to-market ratio (BM),
firm size (Size), and resource and financial industry dummy variables. The information on
control variables is collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream database and is matched
with trade data from DatAnalysis Premium.
Specifically, turnover is defined as log of number of shares traded over the
previous year. Return volatility is the log of the standard deviation of daily returns over the
previous year. To control for other unobservable firmcharacteristics, we also include book-tomarket ratio and a firm size variable. The book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of
equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to the log of market value of equity
at the end of the previous year. The urnover variable, Turnover, exhibits a symmetric
distribution, evident from a mean of 5.545 and a median of 5.696. The mean values of
Volatility and BM are 0.0212 and 0.5743, respectively. The mean and median of Size are
21.393 and 21.267, suggesting that our sample firms are relatively large.
Finally, we control for two industry indicator variables. With the high proportion of
resource firms in the Australian market together with more pronounced information
asymmetry issues in this sector, a resource sector indicator variable is included. Resource
takes on a value of one when the firm is in the resources sector and zero otherwise. As many
of the largest firms in the Australian market are financial institutions which are subject to
additional regulatory scrutiny, we include Financials (which takes the value of one if a firm
operates in the financial sector, and zero otherwise), an indicator variable to account for this
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effect. As shown in Table 1, it is not surprising that approximately 17% of the companies are
in the resources sector while about 25.6% of the sample firms are in the financial sector.
These statistics confirm the necessity to control for these two industries in our empirical
analyses.

3.4 Pearson correlation of variables
There are several noteworthy observations in Table 2 which reports the Pearson
correlation coefficients among all of the variables in this study. First, the measure of the
information content of insider trading, CAR, is negatively and significantly related to postevent adjusted adverse selection cost (adjAdverse) but positively and significantly related to
post-event adjusted PIN (adjPIN). This implies that informative director trading reduces
information asymmetry between corporate directors and outside investors and promotes the
information efficiency through the trading process. Second, while the correlation coefficient
between adjAdverse and adjPIN is 0.011, this coefficient is statistically insignificant. The
implication from this observation is that although both measures capture information-based
stock trading activities, they reflect different dimensions of the firm’s information
environment. Finally, except for the strong correlation between Turnover and Size (the
correlation coefficient is 0.711), all other correlation coefficients among variables are only
moderate, alleviating the multicollinearity concern in our empirical analysis.

<Please insert Table 2 here>

4. Empirical results
4.1 Main analysis
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There has been much debate in the literature on the benefits and costs of insider trading
on the information environment. Opponents of insider trading argue that when directors trade
on their privileged private information, such trading increases the information asymmetry
between corporate insiders and outside investors and worsens the information environment of
stock trading. However, others argue that director trading can facilitate the incorporation of
private information into stock price through their informed trading activities, leading to more
efficient stock prices. In this empirical investigation, we systematically look at the effects of
informed insider trading on both the information asymmetry and information efficiency of the
stock trading environment.
The main analysis is carried out by estimating the following Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression model specification:

InfoEnv    1CAR  2Turnover  3Volatility   4 BM  5 Size 

6 Re source+7 Financials  Year dummies,

(2)

where InfoEnv alternatively represents adjusted adverse selection cost(adjAdverse) or
adjusted PIN (adjPIN) over the event window [0, 120] relative to the director transaction date.
CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120] relative
to the director transaction date. The list of control variables includes stock turnover
(Turnover), stock return volatility (Volatility), book-to-market ratio (BM), firm size (Size), the
resource sector dummy variable (Resource) and the financial sector dummy variable
(Financials). Year dummies are also included to control for the time variations in the
information environment measures over the years.
We first examine the effect of informed director trading on the cost of adverse selection,
adjAdverse, by estimating the baseline regression and reporting the results in model (2) of
Table 3. We observe a consistently strong negative association between returns from trades
and post-director trade adverse selection cost. The coefficient on CAR is -0.178
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(t-value = -4.71). In model (1), the coefficient on CAR is -0.168 (t-value = -4.24) and in
model (3), the coefficient on CAR becomes -0.133 (t-value = -4.41) after controlling for other
stock and firm characteristics including year dummies. The overall results indicate that
informative director trading (measured by director trading profitability) reduces the
information asymmetry between informed traders and uninformed traders and supports
hypothesis H1a. The interpretation is plausible if informed directors deter the informed
trading from other non-directors and therefore level the playing field between informed and
uninformed traders (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992).
The selected control variables appear to capture the expected signs. Taking the full
sample results in model (3) for example, we find a positive relationship between post-director
trading adverse selection cost and stock turnover, indicating that informed traders tend to be
able to hide their traders better in actively traded stocks. In addition, the positive coefficient
on Volatility suggests that stocks with high information uncertainty experience an increase in
adverse selection cost following director trading. Finally, we note that post-director trading
adverse selection cost increases with book-to-market ratio and declines if firms operate in the
resources sector.
<Please insert Table 3 here>

Next, we turn to the effect of director trading on the information efficiency of stock
trading. It is argued that information asymmetry and information efficiency are not identical
concepts because the latter depends on the precision of private information held by corporate
insiders. One would only observe significant impact of director trading on information
efficiency if directors are exposed to precise private information and such information is not
yet disclosed to other market participants. In Table 4, we document a strong positive
relationship between director trading profitability and information efficiency. Without
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controlling for any other variables, the coefficient of CAR is 1.890 (t-value = 2.02) in model
(1). The magnitude and statistical significance remains similar after the incorporation of all
controls including year dummy variables. These results are in line with the notion that
informed director trading is conducive to the information efficiency of stock trading
environment (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992), and supports hypothesis H2.

< Please insert Table 4 here>

We further disaggregate insider trades into purchases and sales and report the results
in Table 5. In models (1) and (2), the results show a negative relation between CAR and
adjAdverse for director purchases but a positive relation between CAR and adjAdverse for
director sales, suggesting that informed director purchases have distinct effects from director
sales. On average, director purchases mitigate the information asymmetry faced by
uninformed liquidity traders while director sales aggravate the problem.
Next, we examine whether the effect of director trading on information efficiency is
related to the direction of director trades by partitioning our sample into purchases sales. The
results in models (3) and (4) of Table 5 show a positive and significant coefficient on CAR on
the director purchases subsample (which accounts for 87% of the full sample) with an
insignificant coefficient in the director sales subsample (13% of the full sample). Consistent
with the information asymmetry effect, it appears that only director purchases help to
promote the informational efficiency of the stock trading environment by impounding private
information into stock prices, supporting hypothesis H3a.

< Please insert Table 5 here>
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As stated in H4 and H4a, there could be an information hierarchy between executive
and non-executive directors. Executives are under stricter scrutiny while non-executive
directors can trade relatively freely. Therefore, the information content of non-executive
director trading can be richer than that of executive director trading. After splitting all
director trades into executive and non-executive trades in Table 6, it is clear that nonexecutive trades are more prominent in our sample, which accounts for approximately 73% of
the full sample, consistent with the low level of liability associated with non-executive trades.
By regressing adjusted adverse selection cost on the director trading profitability
measure, CAR on both executive trades and non-executive trades subsample, we find negative
and highly significant coefficients on CAR across both subsamples in models (1) and (2),
while the coefficients show a stronger effect in the non-executive trades subsample. However,
the effects of executive trades versus non-executive traders are remarkably distinct on
information efficiency, as shown in models (3) and (4). We note an insignificant coefficient
on CAR on executive trades subsample while a positive and significant coefficient on CAR on
non-executive trades subsample. These results collectively suggest that it is the information
distilled from non-executive trades that has a stronger influence on the informational
efficiency of the stock trading environment. Our findings support the argument that insiders
should not be treated as a homogenous group of informed traders and the different levels of
scrutiny surrounding executives and non-executive director trading causes them to trade
differently on the information they have obtained.

< Please insert Table 6 here>

4.2 Robustness tests
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We address several concerns about our empirical design in this section. Because of
the overlap in the event window we use to compute director trading profitability and two
information environment variables, it is possible that the observed relationship between the
two sets of variables are simultaneously driven by the same but unobservable firm/stock
characteristics. To mitigate this concern, we re-estimate the two information proxies using an
alternative event window [121, 240] relative to director transaction date. The related results
are reported in models (1) and (2) of Table 7. We find that the coefficient of CAR is -0.309 (tvalue = -7.56) when new adjusted adverse selection cost is used as dependent variable, while
the coefficient of CAR is 1.873 (t-value = 1.80) when new adjusted PIN is the dependent
variable. The results are qualitatively the same as the previous findings.
In addition, it is argued that buy-and-hold returns are more efficient than cumulative
abnormal returns if the event window tends to be long. To ensure the robustness of our results,
we re-estimate the measure of director trading profitability as the buy-and-hold abnormal
returns over the event window [0, 120] relative to director transaction date. In models (3) and
(4), we find results consistent with those reported in Table 3 and Table 4.

<Please insert Table 7 here>

It should be noted that two significant market events occurred during our sample
period from 2002 to 2010. The prominent events include the adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Australia in 2005 and the adverse economic impact
of the global financial crisis in 2008. In Table 8, we take a further step and examine whether
these important market events have any influence on the relationship between director trading
profitability and the stock trading environment. Specifically, to evaluate the effect of IFRS on
director trading profitability, we introduce an additional dummy variable, IFRS, into the
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baseline regression model (2). This dummy variable takes a value of one if the observation is
on or after fiscal year 2005, and zero otherwise. In Table 8, including the dummy IFRS and
the interaction term between IFRS and CAR, we observe a negative and significant coefficient
on IFRS in model (1) when adjusted adverse selection cost is used as dependent variable, but
an insignificant coefficient on IFRS in model (3) when adjusted PIN is used as dependent
variable. These results are consistent with prior literature which finds evidence of the IFRS
adoption improving financial transparency and thereby reducing information asymmetry with
outside investors (Daske et al., 2008; Barth et al., 2008). However, we find no significant
effect of the interaction terms in either model (1) or model (3), indicating that there is no
distinguishable effect of the IFRS adoption on the relationship between director trading
profitability and the stock trading information environment. This indicates that the
information available to insiders under IFRS does not affect their trading returns and is
consistent with the superior information held by these insiders, regardless of the introduction
of IFRS. This finding mirrors Straser (2002) where there was no change in cost of adverse
selection or probability of informed trading with the introduction of Regulation FD.
We further examine the impact of global financial crisis on the association between
informative director trading and stock trading information environment in models (2) and (4)
of Table 8. Empirically, we incorporate a global financial crisis dummy variable (GFC) and
its interaction with CAR into the baseline model. The GFC dummy variable takes a value of
one if the observation is in year 2008, and zero otherwise. Interestingly, in model (2), we find
a negative coefficient on GFC when adjusted adverse selection cost is used as dependent
variable. It implies that the post-director trading information asymmetry declines in the year
of global financial crisis. Our interpretation is that the widespread global financial crisis
directs investor attention to market-wide information and therefore alleviates the impact of
firm-specific information. More importantly, we find that the coefficients of the interaction
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between GFC and CAR are statistically insignificant in models (2) and (4), suggesting that
global financial crisis has no marginal effect on the relation between the information content
of director trading and stock trading information environment. Overall, results in Table 8
suggest that our finding on the impact of director trading is robust to different market
conditions.
<Please insert Table 8 here>

5.

Summary and Conclusion
In this study we investigate an important and much debated issue about the empirical

effect of director trades on firm information environment. Using adverse selection cost and
probability of informed trading as proxies for two important but distinct dimensions of
information environment, we document several interesting results.
First, on a sample of the 300 largest Australian firms for the period 2002-2010, the
information content of corporate insider trading, measured by director trading profitability,
exhibits an inverse relation with post-director trading information asymmetry between
corporate directors and outside investors, measured by adjusted adverse selection cost. This
suggests that informative director trading decreases information asymmetry. We also
document a positive relationship between director trading profitability and post-director
trading information efficiency, measured by PIN. This finding is consistent with director
trading facilitating the improvement of stock price informativeness and the information
efficiency of stock trading environment. Further analysis reveals that the above results are
mainly driven by director purchases instead of director sales.
We also investigate the differential effects of executive and non-executive director
trading on the stock trading information environment. Though our results suggest no distinct
impact of executive and non-executive director trading on the information asymmetry aspect
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of the stock trading environment, it appears that non-executive director trading promotes
information efficiency. Finally, we examine the marginal impact of significant market events,
the adoption of IFRS in 2005 and the global financial crisis in 2008, on the association
between the information content of director trading and the stock trading environment but
document no significant impact from these events.
This study supports the viewpoint that trading by directors is crucial for reducing
information asymmetry and improving information efficiency for stock market participants.
Further, it is also important to understand how the types of director trades and the roles of the
directors affect information asymmetry and information efficiency differently. Such trading
activity has to be effectively regulated and monitored to ensure transparency and confidence
in capital markets. The objectives of director trading regulation and disclosure requirements
are for investor protection, that is, to ensure investors operate in an informed and orderly
market. Up to date and complete information about changes in the shareholdings of directors
is vital to investors and the market in general to comprehend the effect of these changes on
firm value. If such information is not available or incomplete, i.e., when there is a lack of
transparency, then investors may not be able to make savvy decisions on their trading. The
2008 Australian Share Ownership Study conducted by the ASX showed that 41% of adult
Australians owned shares and of these, 90% participated in the market directly via shares,
other listed investments and self-managed superannuation funds. Given the proportion of
these types of investors in the Australian market, complete disclosure of director trading has
become increasingly critical. A comprehensive documentation of director trading activity is
fundamental if we are to better understand the impact and effect of these activities on many
aspects of firm value and trading participation.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of all the variables employed in this study. The summary
statistics include mean value (Mean), median value (Median), standard deviation (StdDev), 5th
percentile (P5) and 95th percentile (P95), minimum value (Min) and maximum value (Max). Adverse
is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of
the insider transaction. PIN is the probability of informed trading (PIN) measure by Easley, Kiefer,
O’Hara and Paperman (1996) estimated in the event window [0, 120]. adjAdverse is the average of
daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the insider
transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, -21]
relative to the insider transaction date. adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120]
scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider
trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0,
120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio
calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm
operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the
value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The number of insider trades with non-missing variables
is 17,676. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010.

Mean

Median

Std

P5

P95

Min

Max

Adverse

0.0024

0.0018

0.0020

0.0005

0.0065

0.0003

0.0106

PIN

0.1818

0.1715

0.0910

0.0228

0.3390

0.0005

0.4678

adjAdverse

1.0237

0.9710

0.3390

0.5796

1.6722

0.4223

2.3959

adjPIN

3.3624

0.9810

15.0426

0.2518

2.6058

0.0037

125.8103

CAR

0.0242

0.0178

0.2076

-0.2968

0.3686

-0.6131

0.7440

Turnover

5.5450

5.6963

1.4528

3.0908

7.6976

2.2459

8.5119

Volatility

0.0212

0.0182

0.0102

0.0097

0.0427

0.0079

0.0576

BM

0.5743

0.4925

0.3785

0.1409

1.3312

0.0721

2.0625

Size

21.3932

21.2669

1.6449

18.9211

24.4431

18.1249

24.8658

Resource

0.1714

0.0000

0.3769

0.0000

1.0000

0.0000

1.0000

Financials

0.2559

0.0000

0.4364

0.0000

1.0000

0.0000

1.0000
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Table 2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among all the variables employed in this study. adjAdverse
is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the insider
transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, -21] relative to the
insider transaction date. adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120] scaled by the PIN measure
estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative
market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the
previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the bookto-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources
industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in
financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution.
The p-values are shown in the parentheses. The number of insider trades with non-missing variables is 17,676. The
sample period is from 2002 to 2010.

adjAdverse adjPin
adjAdverse
1.000
adjPIN
0.011
1.000
(0.13)
CAR
-0.103
0.026
(0.00)
(0.00)
Turnover
0.016
0.033
(0.04)
(0.00)
Volatility
0.210
0.011
(0.00)
(0.15)
BM
0.092
-0.016
(0.00)
(0.04)
Size
-0.032
0.026
(0.00)
(0.00)
Resource
-0.052
0.010
(0.00)
(0.21)
Financials
-0.002
-0.009
(0.74)
(0.22)

CAR

Turnover Volatility

BM

Size

Resource Financials

1.000
-0.028
(0.00)
0.066
(0.00)
0.000
(0.95)
-0.045
(0.00)
0.069
(0.00)
-0.049
(0.00)

1.000
-0.049
(0.00)
-0.037
(0.00)
0.711
(0.00)
0.129
(0.00)
0.096
(0.00)

1.000
0.228
(0.00)
-0.361
(0.00)
0.307
(0.00)
-0.223
(0.00)

1.000
-0.334
(0.00)
-0.087
(0.00)
0.042
(0.00)

1.000
-0.010
(0.18)
0.321
(0.00)

1.000
-0.267
(0.00)

1.000
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Table 3 Effects of Insider Trading Profitability on Information Asymmetry
This table presents the regression results of the stock trading information proxy, adjAdverse,
on the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together with other control
variables. adjAdverse is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120]
where day 0 is the date of the insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs
computed over the window [-120, -21] relative to the insider transaction date. CAR is the cumulative
market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares
traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns in the
previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by the
market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable
which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero
otherwise. All variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values
based on the standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is
the number of observations. Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to
2010.

(1)
(2)
(3)
Intercept
1.028
0.421 0.868
(142.03) (2.95) (5.40)
CAR
-0.168 -0.178 -0.133
(-4.24) (-4.71) (-4.41)
Turnover
-0.006 0.015
(-0.71) (2.13)
Volatility
9.140 5.094
(8.85) (3.57)
BM
0.046 0.079
(1.67) (3.15)
Size
0.021 0.005
(2.70) (0.62)
Resource
-0.111 -0.080
(-6.07) (-5.01)
Financials
-0.009 -0.009
(-0.50) (-0.66)
Year FE
No
No
Yes
NObs
17,676 17,676 17,676
Adj. R2
1.0%
7.6% 28.8%

39

Table 4 Effects of Insider Trading Profitability on Stock Price Informativeness
This table presents the regression results of the stock trading information proxy, adjPIN, on
the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together with other control variables.
adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120] scaled by the PIN measure estimated in
the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading transaction.. CAR is the cumulative
market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares
traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns in the
previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by the
market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable
which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero
otherwise. All variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values
based on the standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is
the number of observations. Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to
2010.

Intercept
CAR

(1)
3.316
(10.98)
1.890
(2.02)

Turnover
Volatility
BM
Size
Resource
Financials
Year FE
NObs
Adj. R2

No
17,525
0.1%

(2)
-0.958
(-0.20)
1.882
(2.01)
0.269
(0.83)
25.926
(0.83)
-0.563
(-0.87)
0.126
(0.48)
-0.209
(-0.26)
-0.400
(-0.52)
No
17,525
0.2%

(3)
1.324
(0.25)
1.893
(2.13)
0.339
(1.07)
4.798
(0.11)
-0.686
(-1.01)
0.058
(0.21)
-0.029
(-0.04)
-0.399
(-0.52)
Yes
17,525
0.5%
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Table 5 Effects of Insider Purchases and Sales on Stock Trading Information
Environment
This table presents the regression results of two stock trading information proxies,
adjAdverse and adjPIN, on the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together
with other control variables. Year dummies are also included in all the estimation models.
Models (1) and (3) report results based on the subsample of insider purchases while Models
(2) and (4) estimate the regression models on the subsample of insider sell. adjAdverse is the
average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the
insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, 21] relative to the insider transaction date. adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0,
120] scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider
trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0,
120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio
calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm
operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the
value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors adjusted for
firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is
the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010.

Intercept
CAR
Turnover
Volatility
BM
Size
Resource
Financials
Year FE
NObs
Adj. R2

adjAdverse
Purchase
Sell
(1)
(2)
0.800
1.245
(4.68)
(6.43)
-0.191
0.235
(-5.46)
(4.28)
0.014
0.025
(1.78)
(2.62)
6.358
0.287
(4.22)
(0.16)
0.071
0.074
(2.67)
(2.07)
0.007
-0.009
(0.89)
(-1.01)
-0.082
-0.069
(-4.68)
(-3.06)
-0.010
-0.013
(-0.69)
(-0.61)
Yes
Yes
15,396
2,899
29.7%
27.5%

adjPIN
Purchase
(3)
4.127
(0.70)
1.865
(1.88)
0.424
(1.21)
-15.019
(-0.34)
-0.795
(-1.04)
-0.070
(-0.23)
0.121
(0.13)
-0.299
(-0.36)
Yes
15,263
0.5%

Sell
(4)
-19.862
(-2.34)
0.659
(0.45)
-0.256
(-0.64)
191.956
(1.95)
0.822
(0.68)
0.965
(2.54)
-2.049
(-1.99)
-0.819
(-0.89)
Yes
2,874
1.2%
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Table 6 Effects of Executives’ and Non-executives’ Trading Profitability on Stock
Trading Information Environment
This table presents the regression results of two stock trading information proxies,
adjAdverse and adjPIN, on the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, together
with other control variables. Year dummies are also included in all the estimation models.
Models (1) and (3) report results based on the subsample of insider trades executed by
corporate executives while Models (2) and (4) estimate the regression models on the
subsample of insider purchases executed by non-executive directors. adjAdverse is the average
of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is the date of the insider
transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [-120, -21]
relative to the insider transaction date. adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120]
scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider
trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0,
120]. Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio
calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of
market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm
operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable which takes the
value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables are winsorised
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors adjusted for
firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is
the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010.

adjAdverse
NonExecutives
Executives
(1)
(2)
Intercept
0.679
0.891
(2.53)
(4.85)
CAR
-0.091
-0.157
(-2.24)
(-4.42)
Turnover
0.017
0.015
(1.40)
(1.89)
Volatility
6.885
4.956
(2.76)
(3.18)
BM
0.067
0.083
(1.84)
(2.90)
Size
0.013
0.003
(1.06)
(0.40)
Resource
-0.097
-0.077
(-3.78)
(-4.46)
Financials
-0.013
-0.006
(-0.60)
(-0.41)
Year FE
Yes
Yes
NObs
4,407
11,882
Adj. R2
30.0%
28.6%

adjPIN
Executives
(3)
-8.356
(-1.29)
1.947
(1.54)
0.193
(0.46)
49.754
(0.95)
0.596
(0.91)
0.416
(1.18)
0.912
(0.79)
-0.112
(-0.12)
Yes
4,375
0.4%

Nonexecutives
(4)
6.481
(0.94)
1.860
(1.86)
0.456
(1.17)
-13.513
(-0.24)
-1.360
(-1.60)
-0.150
(-0.42)
-0.343
(-0.33)
-0.394
(-0.43)
Yes
11,779
0.7%
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Table 7 Robustness Tests
This table presents two sets of robustness tests on the main results. In Models (1) and (2), we use adjAdverse240
and adjPIN240 as the dependent variables, where adjAdverse240 is the daily average adverse selection cost
computed in the window [121, 240], scaled by the daily average adverse selection cost computed in the
estimation window [-120, -21]; and adjPIN240 is the PIN variable estimated in the window [121, 240] scaled by
the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading transaction. In
Models (3) and (4), we use an alternative measure of insider trading profitability, BHAR, which is computed as
the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns in the window [0, 120]. Year dummies are also included in all
the estimation models. adjAdverse is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120]
where day 0 is the date of the insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over
the window [-120, -21] relative to the insider transaction date. adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the
window [0, 120] scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the
insider trading transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120].
IFRS is a dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after fiscal year 2005, and zero otherwise.
GFC is a dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after year 2008, and zero otherwise.
Turnover is the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of
daily stock returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity
divided by the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy
variable which takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is
a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All
variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors
adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is
the adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010.

Intercept
CAR

AdjAdverse240
(1)
1.295
(5.78)
-0.309
(-7.56)

AdjPIN240
(2)
1.503
(0.24)
1.873
(1.80)

BHAR
Turnover
Volatility
BM
Size
Resource
Financials
Year FE
NObs
Adj R2

0.033
(3.00)
3.738
(1.79)
0.094
(3.05)
-0.017
(-1.59)
-0.113
(-4.83)
0.004
(0.19)
YES
16,933
36.5%

0.460
(1.13)
-11.834
(-0.25)
-0.394
(-0.48)
0.053
(0.16)
-0.033
(-0.03)
-0.507
(-0.56)
YES
16,764
1.8%

AdjAdverse
(3)
0.871
(5.44)

AdjPIN
(4)
1.284
(0.24)

-0.138
(-5.11)
0.015
(2.11)
5.088
(3.57)
0.078
(3.11)
0.005
(0.61)
-0.079
(-4.97)
-0.009
(-0.69)
YES
17,676
0.365

1.830
(2.04)
0.341
(1.08)
5.020
(0.11)
-0.672
(-0.99)
0.059
(0.22)
-0.037
(-0.05)
-0.396
(-0.52)
YES
17,525
0.008
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Table 8 Effects of IFRS adoption and Global Financial Crisis on the Relationship
between Insider Trading Profitability and Stock Trading Information Environment
This table presents the regression results of two stock trading information proxies, adjAdverse and adjPIN, on
the information content of insider trades measure, CAR, and its interactions with the IFRS adoption and GFC
dummy variables, together with other control variables. Year dummies are also included in all the estimation
models. adjAdverse is the average of daily adverse selection costs in the event window [0, 120] where day 0 is
the date of the insider transaction, scaled by daily average adverse selection costs computed over the window [120, -21] relative to the insider transaction date. adjPIN is the PIN variable estimated in the window [0, 120]
scaled by the PIN measure estimated in the estimation window [-120, -21] relative to the insider trading
transaction. CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the event window [0, 120]. IFRS is a
dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after fiscal year 2005, and zero otherwise. GFC is a
dummy variable which equals one if the observation is on or after year 2008, and zero otherwise. Turnover is
the log of number of shares traded in the previous year. Volatility is the log of standard deviation of daily stock
returns in the previous year. BM is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of equity divided by
the market value of equity. Size is equal to log of market value of equity. Resource is a dummy variable which
takes the value of one if the firm operates in resources industry, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy
variable which takes the value of one if a firm operates in financial industry, and zero otherwise. All variables
are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. The t-values based on the standard errors adjusted
for firm-level clustering are reported in the parentheses. NObs is the number of observations. Adj. R2 is the
adjusted R-squared. The sample period is from 2002 to 2010.

Intercept
CAR
IFRS
IFRS*CAR
GFC
GFC*CAR
Turnover
Volatility
BM
Size
Resource
Financials
Year FE
Nobs
Adj. R2

adjAdverse
(1)
(2)
0.354
0.174
(2.54)
(1.18)
-0.178 -0.160
(-2.94) (-3.64)
-0.083
(-5.68)
-0.008
(-0.11)
-0.096
(-4.40)
-0.039
(-0.60)
-0.004 -0.009
(-0.45) (-1.03)
10.586 11.947
(10.09) (9.27)
0.040
0.071
(1.44)
(2.75)
0.025
0.031
(3.32)
(3.94)
-0.114 -0.120
(-6.28) (-6.27)
-0.013 -0.014
(-0.76) (-0.78)
Yes
Yes
17,676 17,676
8.8%
8.5%

adjPIN
(3)
(4)
-0.924 -0.410
(-0.19) (-0.09)
3.868
3.268
(1.57)
(2.45)
0.262
(0.49)
-2.492
(-0.91)
0.264
(0.34)
-3.139
(-1.62)
0.263
0.282
(0.81)
(0.88)
23.251 22.100
(0.75)
(0.69)
-0.562 -0.655
(-0.87) (-0.96)
0.120
0.100
(0.46)
(0.38)
-0.211 -0.229
(-0.26) (-0.28)
-0.398 -0.373
(-0.52) (-0.48)
Yes
Yes
17,525 17,525
0.2%
0.2%
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